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DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA OF ONE'S
OWN CHECK.
II: Checks on ParticularFunds. Where a merchant gives
a draft or bill of exchange, it is founded more or less on his
general credit This is so, even though the drawee may be
possessed of funds or property of the drawer. The draft is
not good against the drawee until accepted.
An order, on the other hand, is addressed with respect to a
particular fund or indebtedness, and derives no force from the
drawer's general responsibility. Excepting as modified by
rights of innocent third parties who have given prior notice, it
is valid, although the drawee has not been notified, or though
he refuses to accept it.'
'The opinion of Kent, J., in Cruger v. Armstrong, 3 John. Cas. 5, 8, is
often referred to in this connection: "Checks are, substantially, the
same as inland bills, and are negotiable like inland bills payable to
bearer. (Chitty, x6, 17, io9, el fiassin.) Lord Kenyon, in a late case
(Boehm and others v. Sterling and others, 7 Term Rep. 423) said, hewas
satisfied there was no distinction between checks and bills; and in that
case the check was declared upon as a bill of exchange, and so it was,
also, in the case of Grant v. Vaughan, 3 Burr. 1516, 1 Bl. Rep. 485, in
which it is called a "cash note or bill."
The question before Judge Kent was whether the check-holder was
bound to exercise proper diligence in presenting the check to the bank.
And see Harker v. Anderson, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 372, 1839.
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It is decided by a preponderance of authority that an ordinary bank check is not an assignment, either at law or in equity.
Drawn on an active, changing account which is large one day
and, perhaps, small the next, the check cannot be regarded as
addressed to any particular fund, and it is therefore more a
promise that the check shall be honored when presented than
that any certain funds shall respond to it. Moreover, a checkholder has no status against the bank, because the bank did
not contract with him, and it shall not be held on a contract
into which it did not enter. A bank, like any other debtor,
assumes but the one responsibility, to the depositor; and
cannot be exposed to as many suits as there are checks
against the deposit. This is a reason which regards rather
the bank than the drawer of the check. Where the bank
account has ceased to be an active one, the safety of the
banking business does not require that the check shall be
denied any force as an assignment; and if, in sucha case,
at least, it appear that the intention was to transfer either
the deposit or even a part of it, equity will recognize the
assignment.
There have been quite a number of adjudications to this
effect, and they have just received the confirmation and support of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Fourlt
Street Bank v. Yardley. 165 U. S. 634. The Keystone
National Bank of Philadelphia applied to the Fourth Street
Bank for $25,000 of gold certificates, for which the Keystone
Bank was to give its check against its reserve account in the
Tradesmen's National Bank of New York City. The two
banks, although located in the same city, had had no commercial transactions between each other, and in that respect had
been strangers to each other. The application was explained
by the statement by the Keystone Bank to the Fourth Street
Bank that the Keystone owed a balance at the clearing-house
which it could not meet because its funds were in the City of
New York; and the Keystone Bank exhibited a memorandum
showing the amount of its credit with the Tradesmen's Bank
to be in the neighborhood of $27,oooThe certificates
applied for were given and the Keystone's check on the
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Tradesmen's Bank for $25,000 was delivered to the Fourth
Street Bank. The check was forwarded at once, and was
presented at the Tradesmen's Bank on the following morning,
when payment was refused on the ground that there were not
funds to the amount of the check. Later in the day, the Keystone Bank was closed by Government. At the time of the
presentment of the check, the Keystone had with the Tradcsmen's Bank $19,725.62 in cash, and collection items amounting to $7181.70, in all $26,907.32.
Of this amount, $I8,056.21 had been remitted by the Keystone Bank on the day
previous. Mr. Justice White said: " Had the transaction been
an ordinary one, that of a time or even demand loan made with
a person in good credit in the line of its business, and not, as
it was, an extraordinary transaction, we might well presuppose
that it was the expectation of the Fourth Street Bank that the
borrower should merely have on hand with the Tradesmen's
Bank when the check was presented a sufficient amount to
pay it. But the Keystone Bank, in disclosing its hazardous
situation and indicating the specific fund dedicated to the payment of the solicited accommodations, did not represent that
it expected to further check against the Tradesmen's Bank
before the check which it proposed to give might be presented.
The statements made clearly implied to the contrary, exhibiting as they did the embarrassment of the borrowing bank,
arising from the need of available cash to meet its clearings,
and proposing a transaction by which the Fourth Street Bank
would obtain from a bank, but a few hours distant, the prompt
and certain payment of its advance." The court accordingly
held that the intention of the parties was that the check,
although drawn generally, should be paid out of a particular
fund; and that it must therefore be treated as though an order
for payment out of a specific, designated amount.
The
Fourth Street Bank accordingly was held by a divided court,
to be entitled to demand the full amount of $25,000 from the
receiver of the Keystone Bank, to whom the amount had
been paid by the Tradesmen's Bank.
The citations by Mr. Justice White fully sustain the principle laid down, that where the intent of the parties is that the
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check shall operate as an equitable assignment of a specific
fund, it shall work such effect.
Risley v. Phenix Bank, 83 N. Y. 3 8, was as follows: "The
Phenix Bank, prior to May 20, 186I, was the correspondent
in the city of New York of the Bank of Georgetown, a banking corporation located at Georgetown, South Carolina; and
on that date there was on its books a credit to the Bank of
Georgetown to the amount of about $I8,ooo, derived from
deposits and collections, which sum was then owing by the
Phenix Bank to the Bank of Georgetown. The plaintiff was a
resident of Georgetown, and had dealings with the Bank of
Georgetown. He was examined on the trial as a witness in
his own behalf, and testified in substance that on the day when
the check was dated, the president of the bank stated to him
that the bank had a claim of $ 17,000 or $I 8,ooo against the
Phenix Bank, and offered to sell it to the plaintiff, stating as a
reason, that he, the president, was afraid it might be lost during
the war, and that he was unwilling to carry the risk; that the
plaintiff offered to purchase the claim at fifty cents on the dollar,
which offer was declined, and the president then offered to sell it
for Southern bank bills at par; that the plaintiff then offered, if
the bank would divide *the claim, to purchase $io,ooo of it,
upon the terms proposed, which offer was accepted, and the
plaintiff thereupon paid the $io,ooo; that the question arose
as to what kind of a transfer should be given, and the president of the bank said he would give the plaintiff an order on
the Phenix Bank for the amount, and thereupon gave the
plaintiff the check before referred to, and this completed the
transaction between the plaintiff and the Bank of Georgetown."
Held, an assignment enforceable against the Phenix Bank for
the amount of the check.
Risley v. Phenix Bank was followed by Coates v. FirstNat.
Bank, 91 N. Y. 26. The Emporia Bank claimed to be
entitled to a part of a balance of a deposit, under the following circumstances: The Mastin Bank had deposits with Donnell, Lawson & Co., in New York city. There had been a
custom between the various parties by which the Mastin Bank
would cause its credits to be transferred to amounts directed
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to the name of the Emporia Bank. On the occasion in question, being indebted to the Emporia Bank, the Mastin Bank
was requested to transfer on account thereof $5ooo of the
funds to the credit of the Mastin Bank with Donnell, Lawson
,& Co. They replied that they would, and at once charged
the Emporia Bank and credited themselves with the amount,
and on the same day by letter informed the Emporia Bank
that this had been done; and by letter they also notified Donnell, Lawson & Co., to credit the account of the Emporia
Bank with the sum named. The Emporia Bank also gave the
Mastin Bank credit for the amount. These facts were held to
,constitute an agreement estopping the one bank from saying
the deposit had not been transferred to the amount of $5ooo,
and estopping the othei bank to deny an extinguishment of
-the indebtedness. "Written out, the contract indicated by
'the bank ent-ies and the correspondence is one of assignment
,of so much of the credit or funds then to its credit with Donnell, Lawson & Co., to the Emporia Bank, and a discharge of
a debt due by it to that bank. The whole was completed the
moment the letter of the Mastin Bank to the 'Emporia Bank
was placed in the post office."
In Throop Grain Cleaner Co. v. Smitk, IIo N. Y. 83, 88, it
was agaiii held that while the mere delivery to a third person
,of a check or draft drawn by a creditor upon his debtor does
not effect a legal transfer of the debt, yet an equitable assignment may be effected in this way should such be the intention.
The doctrine of these cases was approved in First Nat.
-Bank v. Clark, 134 N. Y. 368. In Gardnerv. National City
-Bank, 39 Ohio St. 6oi, "the controversy was between assignees in insolvency and the owners and payees of a check
or draft made by the insolvents. The assignees in insolvency
were held to stand in the shoes of the insolvent debtors and
to have only their rights in the premises, and it was adjudged
-that parol evidence that the draft was for the exact amount
owing by the drawers, in connection with other facts appearing
from the evidence, sufficiently established the intention to
transfer the property in the fund and constituted an equitable
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assignment thereof good as against the general creditors of theinsolvent."
Reference may be made, also, to Nesmitlz v.Drum,8 W. &
S.9 ; First Nat.Bk. v.Gir, 72 Pa. St. 13 ; Jermyn v. Moffitt,
75 Pa. St- 399; Hemplillv. Yerkes, 132 Pa. St. 545 ; Talor's
Est., 154 Pa. St. 183; Kingman v. Perkins, 105 Mass. III.
The cases which have been cited above are cases injurisdictions where checks given in ordinary commercial transactions are held not to constitute equitable assignments.
They show that even in those jurisdictions the question has
been held to be one of intent. There are very strong intimations in English cases to similar effect, which are recited by
Mr. Justice White, in his opinion in the Keystone Bank matter.
Thus, speaking of a letter forwarded by the maker of a check,
which letter it was contended created a charge in favor of thepayee, Jessel, M. R., said: "You can have no charge in
equity without an intent to charge."' So Vice Chancellor
Bacon said, in respect to a bill of exchange for the exact
amount of a deposit, that whether it should be regarded as an
equitable assignment or not "must rest on evidence."'
In
Citizens' Bank v. First Nat. Bank, L. R. 6 H. L. 352, there
was a similar dictum of strong character by Lord Chancellor
Selborne. An effort was made in that case to establish a parol
contract that certain bills of exchange should be paid out of a
specific fund. The chancellor said, " Of course, if proved, it
would have been a very clear case of contract for an equitable
assignment."
All the decisions and dicta that have been narrated are but
in strict accord with general equitable principles, relative to
orders. If the check is ifitended by the parties to charge a
particular fund, it is then an order rather than an ordinary
check or draft, and as such the authorities in regard to orders
are directly in point. Simmons v. Cincinnati Sav'gs Soc)', 31
Ohio St. 457 (1877), should be mentioned as inconsistent with
the decisions herein narrated. A depositor had $300 in the
bank, and undertook to give that amount by giving a check
I Hopkinson

v. Forster, I,. R. 19 Eq. 74.
2Shand v. Du Boisson, L. R. 18 Eq. 283.
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for the sum. It was held that the gift remaincd incomplcte
until the check was either paid or accepted; and that in the
absence of such payment or acceptance, the death of the drawer
operated, as against the payee, as a revocation of the check.
See to same effect, .Afatter of Smither, 30 Hun. (N. Y.) 632.
III. Orders. The rule was thus announced by Lord
Cottenham: "In equity, an order given by a debtor to his
creditor upon a third person, having funds of the debtor, to pay
the creditor out of such funds, is a binding equitable assignment of so much of the fund." I The rule thus stated is
amply sustained by the authorities.
The leading case is Row v. Dawson, I Ves. Sr. 332, decided

in 1749 by Lord Hardwicke. Tonson and Cowdery lent
money to Gibson, who made a draft on Swinburn, the deputy
of Horace Walpole, viz.: "Out of the money due to me from
Horace Walpole out of the Exchequer, and what will be due
at Michaelmas, pay to Tonson £4oo, and to Cowdery £200,
value received." Gibson became bankrupt. The instrument
recited was held to be an equitable assignment which would
prevail against the assignees in bankruptcy. Lord Hardwicke
said: "This demand, and the instrument under which the
defendants claim, is not a bill of exchange, but a draft; not to
pay generally, but out of his particular fund, which creates no
personal demand: therefore not a draft on personal credit to
go in the common course of negotiation, which is necessary
to bills of exchange, by draft on the general credit of the
person drawing, the drawee, and the indorser, without reference to any particular fund. . . . If this is not a bill of
exchange, nor a proceeding on the personal credit of Swinburn or Gibson, it is a credit on this fund, and must amount
to an assignment of so much of the debt; and though the law
does not admit an assignment of a chose in action, this court
'This was in the well-known case of Burns v. Carvalho, 4 Myl. & Cr.
-69o (1839).
Under 36 & 37 Vict., 1873, ch. 66, 25 (6), such equitable assignments
with express written notice to the debtor, etc., convey the legal title, sub-

ject to equities.
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does; and any words will do, no particular words being necessary thereto."
Ex parte South, Matter of Row, 3 Swanst. Ch. 391, was,
decided by Lord Eldon, in 1818. There the order was given
by a trader to a creditor, directed to the executor of the
trader's debtor. The trader afterwards became bankrupt,
before the order was paid. Lord Eldon held that the order
was an equitable assignment, and undisturbed by the trader'sbankruptcy.
In Lett v. Morris, 4 Sim. 607 (i8,i), a builder gave to the
timber merchant who was to supply him with timber for the
work an order upon the owners for whom the work was to be
done, authorizing payment out of parts of various instalments
named, the timber merchant's receipt to be a discharge. This
was held to be an equitable assignment, by Shadwell, V. C.
In Burn v. Carvalho, 4 Myl. & Cr. 690 (1839), before Lord
Cottenham, one Fortunato had in the first instance given bills.
of exchange on one Rego, in Bahia. Rego refused to accept
the bills, which were dishonored. The payees wrote to Fortunato, expressing their surprise and concern, and requesting
orders to Rego to deliver to them goods of value equivalent
to the bills. Fortunato replied, promising to give the desired
orders, and he wrote also to Rego directing the latter to deliver
certain goods over to the payees. Before the delivery of the
goods pursuant to this direction Fortunato failed. It was held
that the letters to the payees and to Rego constituted an
equitable assignment.
In Diplock v. Hammond, 2 Smale & Giff. 141 (1854), Hammond, a contractor, engaged in work upon a poor-house and
being indebted to plaintiff, gave the plaintiff an order on the
governors of the poor-house. This was held to be an equitable
assignment, and not a mere order requiring a stamp under
55 Geo. III. c. 184.
Another prominent case in this connection is Brice v. Bannister, 3 Q. B. D. 569, decided in 1878, by the Court of
Appeal. There a ship-builder gave to his creditor, the plaintiff,
an order on the defendant, for whom he was constructing a
ship, for £ioo out of moneys due or to become due. No,
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moneys were then due except what had been paid, and the
defendant refused to be bound by the order, and afterwards
paid all the balance due to the ship-builder. It was held that
the order was an assignment of all moneys due or to become
due, to the extent of ,ioo.l
What is known as the rule in Dear/e v. Hall, 3 Russ. I
(1823), is that "notice is necessary to perfect the title, to give
a complete right in rem, and not merely a right as against him
who conveys the interest." 2
This notice is not essential, however, except to priority
And even as to that it was held not essential, where it was impracticable to give it, in the case of an order affecting a ship
at sea.' The assent of the depositary or debtor is not necessary to the equitable assignment
In I873, in Exparte Shellard,6 it was held that an order was
not an equitable assignment where not accepted and where for
but part of the fund. This case is contraty to Brice v. Bannister,7 and has been otherwise disapproved.8
A mere note to a debtor, asking the latter to pay an amount
named to a person mentioned, and not engaging with respect
A letter
to a particular fund, is not an equitable assignment

I Brett, J., dissented. The case of E±#larteShellard, L. R. 17 Eq. O9,
decided in 1873, by Sir Jas. Bacon, C. J., was disapproved.
2Sneli's Eq. (9th Ed.) 96; Johnson v. Cox, I6 Ch. D. 571.
3 Farquhar v. Toronto, 12 Gr. (Upper Canada), I89; In re Pole's
Trusts, 2 Jur. N. S. 685 ; Re Way's Trusts, 5 New Rep. 67. And see
Walker v. Bradford Old Bank, 12 Q. B. D. 511; Rodick v. Gandeil, i De
G. M. & G. 780; Johnstone v. Cox, 26 Ch. D. 571 ; Freshfield's Trust, ii
Ch. D. 298; Newman v. Newman, 28 Ch. D. 674; Buller v. Plunkett, ,
J. & H. 441.
4
Feltham v. Clark, i D. G. & Sm. 307 (2847).
5 Farqulhar v. Toronto, 12 Grant, 289; Yeates v. Grouls, i Ves. Jr. 285 ;
Harding v. Harding, I7 Q. B. D. 446; Brice v. Bannister, 3 Q. B. D. 569.
And see'Greenway v. Atkinson, 29 W. R. 56o ; Expfarle South, 3 Swan.
391 ; Lett v. Morris, 4 Sim. 607 ; Percival v. Dunn, 29 Ch. D. 128.
7Ante.
6L. R. 17 Eq. 109.
"Buck v. Robson, 3 Q. B. D. 686 (2878).
9Percival v. Dunn, 29 Ch. D. 128 (1885) ; Watson v. Duke of Wellington, I Russ. & Myl. 602 (1830) ; ExlparteHall, IO Ch. D. 615 (1878).
A mere letter to a depository, not communicated to the person intended to receive the money, is not an assignment: Morrell v. Wootten,.
16 Beav. 197.
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to a tenant to pay a sum named to a third person is not
enough; and as rent is an interest in land under the English
Statute of Frauds, the court there will not receive parol evidence to connect such a letter with the fund or amount due
by the tenant.
Nor is a direction to the writer's agent to receive money
due by a debtor and to pay it over to a creditor an equitable
assignment, although said agent promises the said creditor to
carry out the instruction. An order on a debtor, and an
authority to some one else, are essentially different things.'
The foregoing order cases are English; but this is merely
because it happened to be more convenient at the time to get
them, and not because American cases are not to the same
effect and equally accessible.2
IV. Gifts of Donor's own Check. All the foregoing long
discussion is very pertinent to the question propounded at the
outset, namely, whether a delivery of donor's own check may
constitute a valid donatio mortis causa. On principle, it seems
clear that such a gift is valid. A donatio mor/is causa, to be
valid at all, must be made under circumstances which relieve
the court from doubt whether such a gift was intended and
actually took place. This necessity of clear proof exists where
the gift is of keys, bonds, mortgages, notes of third persons,
or of whatsoever it may be. Where there is the likelihood of
fraud, no donation mortis causa is allowed. The proof, must be
clear and satisfactory. The gift must be made under circumstances which create in the donor the apprehension of an
impending death. Some exceptional cases might exist where a
merchant might be carrying on his business while in constant
peril; but the ordinary gift mor/is causa is by a man confined
to his bed by severe illness, at a time when it would be folly to
term his bank account a "current" account, to quote the term
used by an English judge. Such a donor regards his account
as fixed, and his check as drawn on a particular fund and not on

1 Rodich
2There

Ju.

v. Gandell, i De G. M. & G. 763 (1851).
is an excellent review of the American cases in Pomeroy's Eq.

1280, et seq.
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his general credit. It is impossible for us to assume that he
meant the check as addressed on his general credit, for then
it would be in the nature of a promise. A promise cannot be
understood. If the check on the bank is not good, the donor
certainly does not mean that his general estate shall compensate for it. On the contrary, he thinks he is making a
present, cash gift. He knows that his bank account has
ceased to be an active one, and regards the check as transferring so much of it as the check calls for.
We must then hold that it is the intent of the donor that his
check shall work an immediate assignment by way or donatio
mnorris causa. This was the opinion of Ruggles, J., in the
very notable case of Harris v. Clark, 3 Com. (N. Y.) 93
(1849). He expressly distinguished a check from a draft in a
question of gift mortis causa, and intimated that a different
decision might be made concerning gifts vzorris causa of donor's
check from what the court then made in respect to a gift of a
bill of exchange.
The question does not seem to have arisen in the American
Supreme Courts. There are a few dicta favorable to the
upholding of such a gift mortis causa. Besides Harris v.
Clark, just mentioned, see Gourley v. Luisenbigler, 51 Pa. St.
345 ; Rhodes v. Childs, 64 Pa. St. I8. Simmonzs v. Cincinnati'
Sav'gs Soc'y, 31 Ohio St. 457, stated supra, is somewhat
obscure, in this connection. If pertinent here, it is adverse to.
the theory of an assignment. ln Matter of Smither, 30 Hun..
(N. Y.) 632, the gift mortis causa by donor's check was held
invalid, in one of the departmental courts.
In England, the question has been before the courts a
number of times. At first, it was held that such a donationmorts causa is valid. Afterwards, one or two judges in
courts of the first instance have held that there is no validity
either at law or in equity in such a gift. Lately, Lord Lindley intimates that he is dissatisfied with the rulings in thecases denying that such gifts can be made; and the principles
established or rather confirmed in the case before him arestrongly in favor of the gifts: Re Dillon, Duffin v. Dzfn, 44
Ch. D. 76 (189o).
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Lawson v. Lawson, I P. Wms. 439, 1718, was decided by
the Master of the Rolls, in I718. The reporter thus states
the facts: "The testator being languishing upon his death-bed,
drew a bill upon a goldsmith to pay ;CIoo to his wife, to buy
her mourning and to maintain her until her life-rent (meaning
her jointure) should become due, and soon afterwards, (viz.,
about seventeen days after the drawing of the bill) the testator
died." The court at first held that the testator's ordering the
goldsmith to pay 'ioo to his wife was but an authority, and
determined by the testator's death. Afterwards, the Master
of the Rolls delivered his opinion solemnly, and held the bill
good, and to operate as an appointment, although, if the wife
had received it during the husband's lifetime, it would have
been liable to some dispute; even then, he inclined to think
that she should have kept it; that being for mourning, it
might operate like a direction given by the testator touching
his funeral, which ought to be observed, though not in the
will. An extravagant gift, the chancellor ought not to make
good, but the gifts here were but -200 whereas the personal
estate amounted to £8ooo.
This case of Lawson v. Lawson, is one- which has been
hemmed over and looked askant at.' Just why, it is hard to
say, unless we dare to assume that it has not really been read
and considered, which of course we cannot do; but such has
been its reception of late. It is for us to jog along, nevertheless, seeking to keep the path we believe it unerringly points
out.
Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. Jr. II I, 1793. Here Lord Chancellor Loughborough had before him the case of a common
check on a banker, intended to effect a gift inter vivos. He
held that such a gift could not be regarded as an "appointment." He referred to Lawson v. Lawson, supra, and lamented
the inaccuracy of the report in Peere Williams; which in one
part attributes as the ground of decision the assumption that
the bill there was an appointment; and which again lays stress
on its being for mourning. He goes on to say, speaking first
of Lawson v. Lawson: " Taking the whole bill together, it is
an appointment of the money in the banker's hands to the
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extent of ioo for the particular purpose expressed in a written
appointment; which is a purpose, that necessarily supposes
his death. Therefore that case is perfectly well decided. But
upon that decision I cannot say, that in all events drawing a
cash note upon a banker is an appointment of the money in
his hands. Suppose I was to apply that idea of an appointment, this is to take effect presently, and has no relation to his
death. The plaintiff might have received it immediately.
There is no reference at all to the case of her surviving him.
It was not appointed under such circumstances, that it could
not take effect but in case of his death; but it is stronger in
this particular .case, as by the evidence it was given, and
"
The transaction before him being one
fairly given ....
inter vivos, could not be interpreted as meaning to effectuate
an assignment as against his executor, and could only be
considered in the light of a promise; for certainly he did not
mean by giving the check to make an assignment good against
himself. Lord Loughborough decided, therefore, that the
check in the case before him was rendered void by the intended
donor's death. The reasoning of Lord Loughborough has
been received with the same suspicion which some would cast
upon Lawson v. Lawson. Yet it is very clear that he was
making a distinction between gifts mortis causa and gifts inter
vuvos, and would infer an intent to make an assignment in the
first class of gifts where he would refuse to impute such an
intent to a transaction inter vivos. We can certainly approve of
the-distinction he makes even though we may not care to adopt
his reasoning in its entirety. An intent to make assignment
of a closed account or of a part of it is more easily inferred than
is an intent to assign part of a "current" or active account.
Easton v. Pratchett, I Cr. M. & R. 798, at 808 (1835).
This was a case where plaintiff endeavored to hold defendant
to an endorsement of a bill of exchange. Lord Abinger said:
"If a man give money as a gratuity, it cannot be recovered
back, because the act is complete; yet a man who promises
to give money cannot be sued on such promise; and if so, I
do not see how a promise in writing not under seal can have
any binding effect. The law makes no difference between
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such a promise and a verbal one. There is the same distinction as to a bill of exchange. If a party gives to another a
negotiable instrument, on which other parties are liable, the
man who makes the gift cannot recover the bill back, and the
man to whom the bill is given may recover against the other
parties on the bill; but it is a very different question, whether
the giver binds himself by the indorsement, so as to make
himself liable thereupon to the person to whom he gives it"
Bouts v. Fllis, 17 Beav. 121 (1853). Affirmed on appeal,
4 De G. M. & G. 249 (I853). This was a case of donatio
mortis causa. The decedent gave his wife a check for £iooo.
Afterwards, because the check was crossed and it was feared
that the bank might not pay it over the counter, the check
was exchanged for a friend's check, which was likewise
crossed and which was post-dated. The donor's check so
given to the friend was cashed; but the crossing and postdating of the friend's check prevented its being paid. The
donor died, and subsequently the friend gave the donee
another check, which was paid. It was held that there had
been a valid gift morris causa; that the friend received the
donor's check as agent for the donee, and that when it was
cashed the money was actually received on behalf of the
donee and before the donor's death.
Hewitt v. Kaye, L. R. 6 Eq. 198 (1868). This case was
decided by Lord Romilly, Master of the Rolls. It was a
contest between two charities, and was not carried up. Whichever might be the decision, the money was bound to go to
charity, and we may not suppose that vigor of argument and
attention which ordinary contests excite. Lord Romilly held
that a donor's own check could not be the subject of a gift
mortis causa if not paid or presented before donor's death.
Bromley v. Brunton, L. R. 6 Eq. 275 (1868). This was a
case of gift inter vivos. A check for .C200 was given by A.
to B. It was presented without delay. The bankers had
sufficient assets of A., but refused payment because they
doubted the signature. The next day A. died, the check not
having been paid. Sir John Stuart, Vice Chancellor, held that
there had been a complete gift, inter vivos, of the amount cf

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA OF ONES OWN CH.CK.

the check. The conteit was between the donee and the administrator.
Hawkins v. Allen, L. R. IO Eq. 246 (1870). The check
here would have been sufficient, for it was cashed, and the
money invested, before donor's death; but the gift was void
under the mortmain law.
Beak v. Beak, L. R. 13 Eq. 489 (1872). This case was
decided by Bacon, Vice Chancellor. lIe held that the donor's
estate could not be bound by donor's delivery of check and
pass-book, the check not being paid or presented before the
donor's death. There is no discussion of principles; and the
case is merely rested on Hewitt v. Kaye, supra, and on Ames
v. Witt, the latter having respect to pass-books.
Rolls v. Pearce, 5 Ch. D. 730 (1877). In this case, donor
and donee were English people resident in San Remo, in
.Italy, where they had gone for the benefit of the donor's
health. The donor, seeing that he was not going to recover
of his illness, gave two checks to his wife, payable to her
order, for £35o altogether, and drawn on his bank in England. The checks were deposited to the wife's account, in an
Italian bank. She drew upon them, and paid debts of her
husband out of the money, One of the checks was long in
coming to England-some two months, and a few days before either one reached the donor's bank the donor died.
Malins, Vice Chancellor, held that the checks constituted
good donations mortis causa, and for two reasons. First,
"these checks are payable to order; and it is clear that the
testator knew that they could not be presented for payment'
either on the -day they were drawn or on the subsequent day.
I must attribute to him the knowledge that the check would
not be paid for some time, and on that ground I come to the
.conclusion that this case differs from the other cases of
.checks." The second reason was that the checks had been
actually dealt with for value. The Vice Chancellor continued:
"But I have also the decision of Lord Loughborough in
Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. i i i. He there says: ' If she has paid
this away either for valuable consideration or in discharging a
,debt of her own, it would have been good.'"
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In this case the
Austin v. Mead, 15 Ch. D. 651 (880).
gave
a seven days'
t270o,
and
note
for
a
deposit
donor held
notice to the bank that he wished to withdraw the deposit.
Afterwards the donor signed a form of check which was on
the back of the deposit note: "Pay self or bearer ;6500."
He then handed the note to the donee, and before the seven
days' notice had expired, he died. Fry, J., held that the
check was not payable until after the date when the intended
donor died.
Clement v. Cheesman, 27 Ch. D. 631 (1884). In this case
there is a dictum by Chitty, J., that donor's own check cannot
form the subject of a donatio mortis causa.
Duffin v. Duffin, 44 Ch. D. 76 (1890). This is the first-mention we find of the question in an appellate court. All the
check cases mentioned above were before courts of first
instance. In Duffin v. Du2fin there are but dicta merelyCotton, L. J., seemed to think that donor's check could not
be the subject of gift inortis causa; whereas Lindley, L. J.,
said: "It is said that there was no good donatio mortis causa,.
because a man cannot make such a gift of his own check. I
will assume that to be correct, though I think it may some
day require consideration." The opinions in this case are well
considered, and sustain and enforce the doctrine of Lords
Hardwicke and Eldon that if donor gives up the means of
getting at possession, such delivery supports the gift. The
court held that a deposit note, although not representing the
debt, could form the subject of a gift mortis causa.
This is really a strong case in favor of the contention that
donor's check can effect a gift mortis causa.
Porter v. Walsh, Irish Rep., Ch. D. 1895, vol. I, 284
(1894). In this case there is a bare mention of the question.
The foregoing review of the authorities shows that both in
this country and in England the authorities are not harmonious.
It may be urged that the reasoning in the carefully considered
case of Dufflin v. Dieffin, In re Dillon, 44 Ch. D. 76 (189o), is
strongly in line with Lawson v. Lawson, where such a gift was
upheld by Lord Loughborough.
Snelg rove v. Bailey, 3 Atk. 214, and the great case of
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-Duffield v. Elwes, I Bli. N. S. 497, established the principle
that when the gift was one morris causa, if the donor delivered
the means of getting at the possession, the gift would standA check so intended by the parties is certainly as much a.
means of getting at possession as is a tally stick, an unassigned (at. law) bond or mortgage, unendorsed note, or key
to a safe deposit vault, especially when the donor has two.
such keys and delivers one. In Thmnas's Adims v. Lee, 89
Va. I (1892), a delivery of one of two keys to a safe deposit
vault, the other having been placed at a prior date with a
friend as a precaution, was held to carry a gift morlis causa
of the contents of the box in the bank.
It has been argued against the validity of the donor's check,
where he dies before it is paid or presented, that it is revocable
and he may recall it or that other holders of checks may draw
out the whole fund. If the donor's mind is unstable and not
under his control, no gift, whether by check or howsoever, is
good. Moreover, revocability attaches to all gifts mortir causa.
"Without that attribute no transaction can be a donatio montl
causa. As to the argument that other checks may withdraw
the fundj it is submitted that this argument contemplates a
state of facts contrary to conditions surrounding almost all
donations mortis causa, which are usually by persons of exhausted vitality whose bank accounts have ceased to be "current." We ought certainly to say, therefore, that a check so
given is upon a designated fund.

Before closing, it is well to recall here the observation of
Lord Loughborough in Tate v. Hilbert, 2 Ves. I I I. He said
that if the donor's promissory note had been paid away for
valuable consideration or in discharging a debt of the donee,
even a gift of the donor's own note would be good because
consummated in that way; the idea evidently being that third
persons' rights intervening could not be disturbed; and the gift
obtaining on their account a completion, the completion
enured even to donee's benefit; because the gift could not be
said to be both executed and not executed. If then the donee
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of the check should deposit it, or should pay it away for
value, the gift would seem to be good, irrespective of the
argument heretofore advanced.'
Luther E. Hewitt.
April

15, 1897.

I In the former part of this article, it was said that while a savings-bank
book did not represent the debt in a legal sense, it formed a valuable
means of" getting at the possession" of the deposit. In this connection,
see Farmers & Heck. Bank v. Boraef, i Rawle (Pa.), 152, decided in
1829.
In that case, a plaintiff suing a bank for the amount of a deposit
was allowed to give in evidence his bank-book showing the deposit, as an
admission by the bank that it had received the amount of the entry.
Reference may be made also to Hottenstein v. Kohler, 37 Leg. Int.
(Pa.) 333, and to Haley v. Caldwell, 2 Miles, (Phila. District Court), 334.
In these cases, it was held that bank-books are instruments of writing for
the payment of money, within the terms of the Pennsylvania Statute,
providing for judgment for want of an affidavit of defence. Over against
these stands Walsh's Apipeal, 122 Pa. 177, which, after all, we cannot be
sure was meant to affect savings-banks books in general. See Hemphill's
Estate, i8o Pa. 87, 92.

